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Abstract
We propose a new model to study the role of commitment as a source of strategic bargaining
power. Two impatient players bargain about the division of a pie under a standard bargain-
ing protocol in discrete time with time-invariant recognition probabilities. Instantaneous
utility is linear, but players discount the future by a constant factor. Before bargaining
starts, a player can commit not to enter into any agreement which gives him less than some
utility level. This commitment is perfectly binding initially. However, once so much time
has passed that even receiving the entire pie would yield less than the committed level of
utility, then the commitment becomes void. Intuitively, this simply means that no player
can remain committed to something which has become impossible. We use a slight refine-
ment of subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept. If only one player can commit,
then we find an immediate and efficient agreement on a division which gives the committed
player (strictly) between one half and the entire pie, the exact allocation being determined
uniquely by the recognition probabilities. If both players can commit sequentially before
the bargaining starts, we find a unique equilibrium division with a first–mover advantage.
Finally, we consider a version of the game where both players commit simultaneously be-
fore the bargaining starts. In this case, there is a range of equilibrium divisions. However,
in the limit as the discount factor goes to one, no player obtains less than one third of
the pie, even with arbitrarily small proposal power. Somewhat surprisingly, the equal split
emerges as the only division supported by an equilibrium for any choice of the discount
factor and the recognition probabilities.
Keywords: Strategic Bargaining, Commitment, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
JEL codes: C72, C78, D74.
1 Introduction
Two players bargain on how to divide a pie of unit size among themselves. They can only
consume the pie once they have agreed on its division. Players are impatient and thus
discount future consumption.
We are interested in the ability to commit as a source of bargaining power. We study
this question using a notion of commitment with the following two characteristics:
First, the commitment is not expressed as a share of the pie but rather in terms of the
pie’s time value discounted back to the beginning of the bargaining process. The simple
rationale behind this specification is that a commitment should be stated in the terms
which the impatient player cares about. Such “value–committing” has been introduced to
the literature earlier by Li (2007) and stands in contrast to the idea of “share–committing”,
which is more standard in the literature.
Second, we will assume that the commitment to a certain time value is perfectly binding
as long as the pie has at least the committed value. However, as soon as so much time
has elapsed that even the receipt of the entire pie would not lead to the committed value
anymore, the commitment is assumed to become void. To the best of our knowledge, this
notion of commitment is new to the bargaining literature.
Our assumption simply means that we do not allow a player to remain committed
to something which is not feasible (anymore). This form of commitment confronts the
player with the following dilemma: A high commitment becomes void soon, whereas a low
commitment stays in effect for a long time.
It has long been recognized that an irrevocable (and perfectly credible) commitment
would be an extremely powerful tool. In fact, if only one player can make such a com-
mitment, the strategic situation resembles that in an ultimatum game, and the committed
player captures the entire surplus – a result which seems unattractively lopsided. The
literature has looked for ways to obtain more attractive or reasonable results by limiting
the commitment’s credibility. The standard approach which has been taken is to introduce
a cost at which a commitment can be revoked. For instance, Muthoo (1992) presents a
model of bargaining which generalizes the Nash (1953) demand game as well as Rubin-
stein’s (1982) well-known alternating offer bargaining procedure. The former is seen as
a polar case of irrevocable commitments, and the latter as an extreme case of revocable
commitments, and the cost of revoking a commitment is used as the parameter scaling
between the two. A typical result in this literature is that the player with the higher cost
of revoking a commitment has an advantage, see, for instance, Muthoo (1996).
A different well-established approach is that of endogenous commitments. For instance,
Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) and Li (2007) consider the possibility that rejecting a
proposal commits a player not to accept any worse proposal in the future, an approach
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which can be motivated by shifts in players’ reference points. This approach has been
extended and combined with the cost of revoking approach by Calabuig, Cunyat, and
Olcina (2002). In Cunyat (2004), a player can choose the strength of his commitment
before the bargaining starts. 1
In what follows, we will study the following game: One out of two players has access
to the aforementioned commitment device. That player announces his commitment level.
Subsequently, a potentially infinite number of bargaining rounds follows. In each such
round, one of the two players is recognized as the proposer by a draw from a time-invariant
probability distribution. The proposing player makes an offer and the game ends if this
offer is accepted by the opponent. In case of a rejection the next round starts. However,
any consumption in the next round will be discounted by a constant factor δ ∈ (0, 1). In
line with our earlier discussion, the commitment device punishes the committed player if
he accepts less than his commitment level while the pie’s value is still higher than that
level. But once the “moment of truth“ where the pie’s value shrinks below the commitment
level has passed, no punishment is given. One interpretation is that the device punishes
“treason“ but forgives “failure“ . Agreeing to less than the commitment while the pie is
still sufficiently valuable is akin to giving in to the opponent (treason, weakness), while
making an agreement after the moment of truth is giving in to the facts after the failure
of an excessively strong bargaining posture. One alternative commitment device would
punish the player not only if he breaks his commitment before the moment of truth, but
also as soon as the moment of truth is reached. After all, in the latter case it is clear
that his promise cannot be fulfilled anymore. It can be shown that this seemingly stronger
commitment device does not confer any bargaining power and is therefore not useful. We
will see, however, that the more flexible commitment device which we propose, does confer
substantial bargaining power.
Using a slight refinement of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we find immediate and
efficient agreement on a unique division of the pie. If the pie shrinks very rapidly, then
the ability to commit is extremely valuable. The committed player can obtain almost the
entire surplus even if his proposal power is close to zero. If the pie shrinks very slowly,
commitment creates less bargaining power and the recognition probabilities become more
important in determining the allocation of the surplus. In the limit as δ goes to one,
proposal power and commitment power are “equally important” in the following sense: If
one player can commit and the other player has a recognition probability close to one, then
the surplus is shared almost equally.
1In a different stream of literature, players can be of a fully rational type or of a stubborn type.
Stubbornness is then a form of commitment. A typical issue within that literature is the possible incentive
of a rational player to try and mimic a stubborn type. Well-known examples are Abreu and Gul (2000)
and Kambe (1999). In this paper, we do not consider different types of the same player.
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We present extensions of the model to games where both players can make a commit-
ment before the bargaining starts. If they do so sequentially, then in the limit as δ goes to
one, the first mover receives a share between one half and two thirds of the pie, depending
on the recognition probabilities. With irrevocable and permanent commitment, one would
expect the first mover to obtain the entire surplus.
We also consider the case where players make their commitments simultaneously. With
irrevocable and permanent commitment, one would expect all efficient pie divisions to be
supported by equilibria irrespective of the value of the discount factor. With the notion of
commitment which we suggest, this is no longer true. If the discount factor is chosen suffi-
ciently large, then we find a rather narrow range of efficient divisions which are supported
by equilibria. More precisely, the share of the pie whose allocation is left unpredicted by
the equilibrium concept in the limit is at most one fifth. Moreover, a player can never
receive less than one third of the pie in an equilibrium with δ close to one – even with
arbitrarily small proposal power. The equal split is the unique division with the property
that it can be supported by an equilibrium regardless of the parameter choices for the
discount factor and the recognition probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we formally describe
the game in which only a single player can make a commitment. In section 3, we study
the bargaining stage of that game and solve for the equilibrium given the choice of com-
mitment. In section 4, the game as a whole is solved and the optimal commitment is thus
derived. In section 5, the game is extended to the case where both players can choose
a commitment before the bargaining starts. Again, an analysis of the bargaining stage
given the commitment levels is given. The conclusions of section 4 will be essential for this
analysis. Section 6 deals with the optimal choice of commitments by both players. Section
7 concludes.
2 The game with one committed player
The player set is N = {1, 2}. The two players have a perfectly divisible pie of unit size
at their disposal. They consume the pie once they have agreed on its division. Each
player’s instantaneous utility is equal to his consumption of pie, but future consumption
is discounted by a constant and common factor δ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that at any time t,
the players can divide among themselves a surplus of value δt. In the sequel, we will mean
by the surplus the time value, discounted to time t = 0, of the pie to be divided.
The game G consists of a commitment stage and a bargaining stage. The game starts
with the commitment stage in which a player (without loss of generality, we suppose it is
player 1) chooses a level of commitment c1 ∈ [0, 1]. The ensuing bargaining stage is set
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in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . .. At the start of each such round t, one player is recognized
as the proposer according to the probability distribution (β1, β2), where β1 + β2 = 1 and
βk > 0 for both k = 1, 2. This player then proposes a division of the surplus, i.e. a pair
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ such that x1 + x2 ≤ δt. If the other player rejects the proposal, round t + 1
starts. If the other player accepts the proposal, it is implemented and the game ends with
the following payoffs for the players:
u1(x1, c1, t) =
x1 − λ if x1 < c1 ≤ δtx1 otherwise
u2(x2) = x2
If players disagree forever, their payoffs are zero.
If c1 ≤ δt, we will say that the commitment c1 is effective at time t. If c1 > δt, we say
that the commitment c1 is void at time t.
The extensive form of the model admits two different interpretations. The main inter-
pretation we use here is that a pie of size one is available but the players are impatient.
Their commitments are expressed in terms of time value rather than the underlying pie
itself. Another interpretation of the model is that a pie of unit size is available initially but
physically shrinks by the factor δ each round, while players are indifferent to the passage
of time. With this interpretation, the commitment is expressed in terms of the physical
pie and expires as soon as that pie has shrunk below the commitment level.
If player 1 agrees to receive less than c1 while the commitment is still effective, he
incurs a cost λ. We are interested in commitments which are perfectly binding until they
expire. Therefore, we assume that λ is large enough so that u1(x1, c1, t) < 0 whenever
x1 < c1 ≤ δt. 2 Thus, perpetual disagreement is better for player 1 than the violation of
an effective commitment.
Suppose that in the game G, player 1 has chosen the commitment level c1 at his
initial decision node. Given c1, the game’s bargaining stage will start. We refer to this
bargaining stage as the bargaining (sub-)game G(c1), which will be analyzed in the next
section. Moreover, we will denote by G(c1, t) some subgame of G(c1) which begins with
the move of nature in round t ≥ 1 of bargaining. Given a bargaining subgame G(c1) and a
round t, there are many such subgames G(c1, t), all of which are, however, equivalent with
regard to strategies and payoffs. 3
2This is ensured for any λ ≥ 1. A different appealing specification is that λ(c1) = c1 for any c1.
3For the analysis, it will be convenient that the random draw of the proposer in each round gives the
game a stationary structure. Matters would be more complicated with a sequential-offers protocol such as
Rubinstein (1982), although the flavor of the main (limit) results in this paper would be expected to carry
over to such a setting as well.
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3 Subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium
In this section, we consider the bargaining subgame G(c1) for any given commitment level
c1, and solve for the equilibrium division of the surplus. As a solution concept, we will use a
slight refinement of the well-known subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE). The purpose
of the refinement is to break ties in favor of agreement. Such a behavior would follow
from SPE in the entire game G, but has to be imposed exogenously when a bargaining
subgame is considered in isolation. More formally, let sBi be the (bargaining) strategy for
player i = 1, 2 in the game G(c1). In accordance with the usual definition of a strategy, s
B
i
assigns to each history of G(c1) either a proposal to be made by player i or a decision on
whether to accept or reject the opponent’s current proposal. As by the standard definition,
a strategy pair (s¯Bi , s¯
B
j ) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) if its restriction to
any subgame of G(c1) is a Nash equilibrium in that subgame. In the following definition,
we introduce a refinement of this equilibrium concept.
Definition 3.1 A strategy pair (s¯Bi , s¯
B
j ) is a subgame-perfect bargaining equilibrium
(SPBE) of G(c1) if it is an SPE and, in addition, satisfies the following conditions.
1. Suppose that under the profile s¯B, player j = 1, 2 rejects a particular proposal, say
x, at some history, say h. Let s˜Bj be the strategy which accepts the proposal x at h
but agrees with strategy s¯Bj at all other histories. Then, the restriction of the profile
(s¯Bi , s¯
B
j ) to the subgame starting at h leads to a strictly greater payoff for player j in
this subgame than the restriction of the profile (s¯Bi , s˜
B
j ).
2. Suppose that under the profile s¯B, there is a history h at which player i = 1, 2 makes
a proposal, say x, which is subsequently rejected by player j 6= i. Suppose further that
in the subgame following this rejection, the appropriate restriction of s¯B leads to a
payoff of ri for player i. Let X˜ be the set of proposals which, if made by player i at
history h, would subsequently be accepted by player j under the profile s¯B. Then, it
holds that ri > x˜i for all x˜ ∈ X˜.
The first condition above says that a player only rejects a proposal in SPBE when
accepting the proposal would make him strictly worse off. The second condition says that
a player only makes an unacceptable proposal in SPBE if this is strictly better for him
than making an acceptable proposal.
In standard bargaining models without commitment, the fact that delay is costly implies
that in any round there is a feasible agreement which strictly Pareto-dominates the payoff
vector which would result from disagreement in that round. Under such conditions, SPE
strategy profiles have the properties that agreement is reached immediately, and that a
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responder accepts a proposal when indifferent between acceptance and rejection. In the
model at hand, however, the commitment leads to a discontinuity in the utility function.
Such a discontinuity makes it possible that in some round, some feasible agreement is
strictly preferred to disagreement by one player, while the other player is indifferent, and
no feasible agreement makes both players strictly better off than disagreement. In such a
situation, the standard SPE concept leaves it indeterminate whether or not an agreement
will be reached. With SPBE as the solution concept, agreement is ensured. It can be shown
that delay on the equilibrium path is inconsistent with SPE if the entire game (including
the commitment stage) is considered. In this sense, the refinement from SPE to SPBE can
be seen as merely technical.
We will now formalize the idea of the “moment of truth” mentioned in the introduction.
Define
τ(c1) =
min{t ∈ N|t > ln(c1)/ ln(δ)} if c1 ∈ (0, 1]0 if c1 = 0
so that in round τ(c1) and all later rounds, the commitment c1 is void. We will say
that the commitment c1 expires at time τ(c1).
Remark 3.2 The definition of τ(c1) readily implies that:
1. δτ(c1) < c1 for all c1 ∈ (0, 1];
2. δc1 ≤ δτ(c1) for all c1 ∈ [0, 1];
3. τ(c1δ
t) = τ(c1) + t for all c1 ∈ (0, 1] and t ∈ N.
These properties of τ(c1) will be exploited repeatedly throughout the paper.
Consider a subgame G(c1, t) for any t ≥ τ(c1). Any such subgame is equivalent to a
bargaining game without commitment. In fact, the only difference compared to the game
in Rubinstein (1982) is that proposals are not made in an alternating fashion but that
the proposer in each round is determined by a fixed recognition probability. The following
lemma says that in such a subgame following the expiry of the commitment, the available
surplus is divided in the proportion of the recognition probabilities.
Lemma 3.3 In any subgame G(c1, τ(c1)), player k’s (k = i, j) expected SPBE payoff is
equal to βkδ
τ(c1).
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Proof: Binmore (1987) proves that the SPE payoffs in such a subgame are equal to
βkδ
τ(c1). The corresponding SPE strategy profile conforms to our definition of an SPBE
strategy profile. 
By setting a commitment of zero, player 1 can effectively choose to play the bargaining
game without commitment, recall that τ(0) = 0. Lemma 3.3 implies that in an SPBE
of that bargaining game, the surplus will be divided in the proportion of the recognition
probabilities, as stated in the following corollary. As one would intuitively expect, the pos-
sibility to commit cannot weaken player 1’s bargaining position compared to an analogous
bargaining game without commitment.
Corollary 3.4 If c1 = 0, then the SPBE payoffs in G(c1) are (β1, β2).
We have earlier introduced G(c1, t) as the notation for a subgame of G(c1) which starts
with the move of nature at round t ≥ 1. Clearly, there are many such subgames, and each
such subgame may in principle have more than one SPBE.
Definition 3.5 We will say that the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, t) are essentially unique if all
SPBE of all subgames of the type G(c1, t) lead to the same payoffs.
In particular, Lemma 3.3 implies that the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, τ(c1)) are essentially
unique for any c1.
We now introduce the notion of a player’s aspiration, which is crucial in the equilibrium
analysis.
Definition 3.6 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, t+ 1) are essen-
tially unique and equal to (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, the players’ aspirations at time t under the
commitment c1 are
αt1(c1) = min{x1 ∈ [0, 1]|u1(x1, c1, t) ≥ vt+11 )}
αt2(c1) = v
t+1
2 (c1)
A player’s aspiration at some point in time is that amount of surplus which the player
would have to receive at that point in order to realize at least his reservation utility, that is,
the expected utility from delaying the agreement to the next time period. The presence of
commitment in our model creates a discontinuity in the utility function of the committed
player. This discontinuity leads to a distinction between what is commonly called the
reservation utility and what we have here defined as the aspiration. More formally, the
above definition implies the following.
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αt1(c1) =
vt+11 (c1) if t ≥ τ(c1)max{c1, vt+11 (c1)} otherwise (1)
αt2(c1) = v
t+1
2 (c1) (2)
In particular, if τ(c1) ≥ 1, then the aspirations of players 1 and 2 at time t = τ(c1)−1 are
αt1(c1) = c1 and α
t
2(c1) = β2δ
τ(c1). Intuitively, when we reason backwards from round τ(c1)
to round τ(c1)− 1, then player 1’s aspiration level jumps up to c1 due to the discontinuity
which occurs in the utility function. As a consequence, the sum of the aspirations before
time τ(c1) may exceed the available surplus so that there is no scope for an agreement.
Lemma 3.7 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, t+1) are essentially
unique and equal to (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, the SPBE of G(c1, t) are essentially unique as well
and are given by
vti(c1) =
αti(c1) + βi
(
δt − αti(c1)− αtj(c1)
)
if αti(c1) + α
t
j(c1) ≤ δt
vt+1i otherwise
(3)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i.
Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that in round t, player i is the proposer
and player j is the responder. Consider the case where αti + α
t
j ≤ δt. (In this proof,
we omit the argument (c1) from the notation.) We claim that in SPBE, agreement will
be reached on the division (δt − αtj, αtj). By definition of αtj and the supposed essential
uniqueness of SPBE of G(c1, t+ 1), it holds that player j weakly prefers an agreement x at
t to disagreement at t if and only if xj ≥ αtj. By the definition of SPBE, it follows that any
proposal x will be accepted by player j at time t if and only if xj ≥ αtj. In particular, the
proposal (δt − αtj, αtj) is acceptable to player j. Indeed, proposing this division is weakly
preferred by player i to disagreement because of the supposition that δt−αtj ≥ αti. By the
definition of SPBE, it follows that player i will make an acceptable proposal. Standard
arguments imply that player i will not make an inefficient proposal, and not offer more
than αtj to player j, so that the SPBE proposal is indeed exactly (δ
t − αtj, αtj). Taking
into account that the proposer is chosen from the distribution β, we have now shown the
lemma for the case where αti + α
t
j ≤ δt. Suppose next that αti + αtj > δt. We show that no
agreement is reached at t. As we have argued before, player j weakly prefers an agreement
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x to disagreement if and only if xj ≥ αtj. Thus, if an agreement x were reached at time
t, then xi ≤ δt − αtj < αti. By definition of αti, the agreement xi gives player i a strictly
lower utility than he would get if there were no agreement at t. But player i has the option
to make an unacceptable proposal to player j, for instance (x˜i, x˜j) = (1, 0). Thus, no
agreement is possible in SPBE at time t, so that the reservation utilitities at t are equal to
the reservation utilities at t+ 1, as desired. 
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.7 provide us with an explicit backward-induction algorithm
to compute the SPBE payoffs in the game G(c1). The former lemma says that the SPBE
payoffs of G(c1, τ(c1)) are essentially unique, and also states these payoffs explicitly. But
the latter lemma allows us to compute the essentially unique SPBE payoffs of G(c1, t)
whenever the essentially unique SPBE payoffs of G(c1, t + 1) are known. At each step of
the backward induction procedure, Equations (1)-(2) give the aspirations in round t as a
function of the reservation utilities vt+1. Then, Equation (3) translates the aspirations αt
into the reservation utilities vt. Since the commitment c1 expires at a finite time τ(c1),
we reach the payoffs v0 after finitely many iterations and have thus computed the SPBE
payoffs of the entire bargaining subgame G(c1). In this way, we arrive at Theorem 3.8,
which will conclude this section. Before stating the theorem, however, we will now give
some illustration of the computations carried out according to the algorithm.
Let us consider first the situation where c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) > 1. (For the purpose of this
illustration, we will drop the arguments (c1) from the notation.) Then, the backward-
induction procedure begins as follows.
vτ = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ )
ατ−1 = (c1, β2δτ )
vτ−1 = (β1δτ , β2δτ ) = vτ
The first line follows from Lemma 3.3, and the second line from Definition 3.6. Since
c1 +β2δ
τ > δτ−1, Lemma 3.7 implies the third line. Finally, we can observe that vτ−1 = vτ .
But now, since c1 + β2δ
τ > 1 ≥ δt for any t = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1, we can iterate the
argument and eventually find v0 = vτ = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ ). We depict the situation on the first
of the following time-lines, where the solid line segment stands for periods where agreement
is possible, and the dotted line segment stands for periods where no agreement is feasible.
Player 1’s commitment is so high that no agreement can be reached while the commitment
is effective.
Now consider the case where c1 > 0 and, furthermore, c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. In that case,
we define
9
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` -bt = 0 τ(c1)
a1(c1) = max{z ∈ N0|δz ≥ c1 + β2δτ(c1)}
In words, round a1(c1) is the latest round of bargaining in which c1 is effective and
the surplus is sufficient to satisfy both players’ aspirations. As in the previous case, the
backward-induction algorithm is initialized by the payoffs at round τ (again, we omit the
arguments (c1)). By the same token as before, we have
vτ = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ )
...
va1+1 = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ ) = vτ
But now, by definition of a1, it holds that c1 + β2δ
τ ≤ δa1 . Therefore, the second case
stated in Lemma 3.7 applies, and we have
va11 = β1(δ
a1 − β2δτ ) + β2c1
va12 = β1β2δ
τ + β2(δ
a1 − c1)
Since va11 ≥ c1, we now have αa1−1 = va1 . In rounds t < a1, aspirations are equal to the
expected payoffs in round t+ 1, and therefore they sum up to δt+1 < δt, so that agreement
is always possible. Iterating this argument yields
v01(c1) = β1 + β2c1 − β1β2δτ(c1)
v02(c1) = β2 − β2c1 + β1β2δτ(c1)
Again, on the second time-line a solid line indicates periods in which an agreement
can be reached and dotted lines indicate periods in which delay occurs because the sum of
aspirations is higher than the current surplus.
The theorem below gives the SPBE payoffs in the game G(c1) as computed by the
backward induction procedure in function of player 1’s choice of c1.
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` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` -b bt = 0 a1(c1) τ(c1)
Theorem 3.8 All SPBE of the bargaining subgame G(c1) lead to a payoff for player 1
given by the following function pi1(c1).
pi1(c1) =

β1 + β2c1 − β1β2δτ(c1) if c1 + β2δτ(c1) ≤ 1 and c1 > 0
β1δ
τ(c1) if c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) > 1
β1 if c1 = 0
In the first and third cases, an efficient agreement is reached immediately so that the
payoff to player 2 equals 1− pi1(c1). Only in the second case, delay occurs, and the payoff
to player 2 is equal to β2δ
τ(c1).
We emphasize that the essential uniqueness of SPBE payoffs in the bargaining subgame
does not imply anything about uniqueness of SPBE strategies. For instance, in a round t
such that a1(c1) < t < τ(c1), no agreement is possible, since the sum of players’ aspirations
exceeds the available surplus. In SPBE, no agreement can therefore occur in such a round
t. However, it is indeterminate which proposal is made in round t.
4 Optimal commitment
In the previous section, we have found player 1’s expected SPBE payoff in the subgame
G(c1) for any commitment level c1. Now we proceed to the analysis of the game G and ask
which level of commitment player 1 will choose in equilibrium. In the game G, a pair of
strategies is a unilateral commitment equilibrium (UCE) if player 1’s choice of commitment
c¯1 satisfies pi1(c¯1) ≥ pi1(c1) for all c1 ∈ [0, 1] and the restriction of the strategy pair to the
bargaining subgame G(c1) is an SPBE in that subgame.
So far, we have not used the assumption that each player has a strictly positive recog-
nition probability. It will become essential in this section.
The content of the following two lemmas is straightforward. It is shown first that in
UCE, player 1 indeed makes use of the commitment device by choosing a strictly positive
c1. On the other hand, we show that in UCE, the commitment will be chosen sufficiently
small so that an agreement can be reached before time τ(c1).
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Lemma 4.1 In any UCE of the game G, it is true that c1 > 0.
Proof: Since limc1↓0[c1 + β2δ
τ(c1)] = 0, we can find c
′
1 > 0 sufficiently small such that
c′1 + β2δ
τ(c′1) ≤ 1. Then, it follows from Theorem 3.8 that pi1(c′) = β1 + β2c′1 − β1β2δτ(c′1).
By definition of τ(c1), it holds that c1 > δ
τ(c1) for any c1 > 0. If β1 < 1, this implies that
pi1(c
′
1) > β1 + β
2
2δ
τ(c′1), which readily implies pi1(c
′
1) > β1. But by Corollary 3.4, β1 is the
payoff to player 1 from the choice of c1 = 0. 
Lemma 4.2 In any UCE of the game G, it holds that c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1.
Proof: Suppose not. Then, by Theorem 3.8, player 1’s UCE payoff in the subgame
G(c1) equals β1δ
τ(c1) ≤ β1δ. Player 1 may deviate from his choice of c1 to a commitment
level of zero. In that case, a payoff of β1 > 0 will result. Since β1 > β1δ, this deviation is
profitable, a contradiction. 
The two previous lemmas show that only the first case mentioned in Theorem 3.8 is
relevant in a UCE of the entire game, giving rise to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3 In any UCE of the game G, an efficient agreement is reached immediately.
The commitment level c1 of player i satisfies c1 > 0 and c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. The payoff to
player 1 is given by
pi1(c1) = β1 + β2c1 − β1β2δτ(c1)
and the payoff to player 2 equals 1− pi1(c1).
The expression for player 1’s payoff in the above corollary can be rewritten as pi1(c1) =
c1 + β1(1− c1 − β2δτ(c1)), and the concomitant payoff of player 2 as β2δτ(c1) + β2(1− c1 −
β2δ
τ(c1)). Hence, given that player 1’s commitment c1 satisfies c1 > 0 and c1 + β2δ
τ(c) ≤
1, the resulting division of the surplus can be interpreted as follows: Player 1 obtains
his commitment level c1, player 2 his resulting aspiration β2δ
τ(c1), and the remainder is
divided in the proportion of the recognition probabilities – as it would be if there were no
commitment.
We now define a particular commitment level (depending on δ and β) and then show
that this commitment will be chosen in UCE. Indeed, let
ψ1 =
δm˜ if δm˜ ≥ 12−δβ11− β2δm˜ otherwise
where m˜ is given by
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m˜ = min
{
m ∈ N0| δm ≤ 1
1 + β2δ
}
Theorem 4.4 In any UCE of the game G, player 1 commits to ψ1. Moreover, agreement
is reached immediately on the division (ϕ1, 1− ϕ1), where ϕ1 = pi1(ψ1).
Proof:
Step 1. In UCE, agreement is reached immediately as by Corollary 4.3, under an
effective commitment c1 > 0 such that c1 +β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. Using the expression for the payoff
in Corollary 4.3, the following statement is easily verified: For some c1 > 0 such that
c1 +β2δ
τ(c1) < 1, suppose that there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small so that τ(c1 + ε) = τ(c1)
and c1 + ε + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. Then, pi1(c1 + ε) > pi1(c1). Hence, c1 cannot be the optimal
choice of commitment. Conversely, we have shown that if c1 is optimal, then either it
holds that c1 = δ
m for some m ∈ N0, or that c1 + β2δτ(c1) = 1.
Step 2. By construction of m˜, any c1 ≥ δm˜−1 would violate the condition
c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1, and can thus not be optimal by Corollary 4.3. We have shown that the
optimal commitment level satisfies c1 < δ
m˜−1.
Step 3. We show next that c1 ≥ δm˜ in UCE. To see this, suppose by way of
contradiction that some c1 < δ
m˜ is optimal. By definition of m˜, we have c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) < 1.
Since the inequality is strict, the argument in Step 1 above implies that c1 = δ
m′ for
some m′ ∈ N0. But then m′ > m˜ because c1 < δm˜. Plugging into the payoff function,
we see that pi1(δ
m˜) > pi1(δ
m′). Thus, player 1 could profitably deviate from c1 = δ
m′ to
a commitment of δm˜, a contradiction. We have now established that c1 ∈ [δm˜, δm˜−1) in
UCE.
For clarification, we remark that τ(δm˜) = m˜ + 1, whereas τ(c1) = m˜ for any
c1 ∈ (δm˜, δm˜−1).
Step 4. In this step, we derive a condition under which there exists some
h > 0 so that δm˜ + h + β2δ
m˜ ≤ 1 and pi1(δm˜ + h) > pi1(δm˜). Rewrit-
ing the first condition, we find h ≤ 1 − (1 + β2)δm˜. Since we are interested
in h > 0 which satisfy the first condition, we know from Corollary 4.3 that
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pi1(δ
m˜ + h) = β1 + β2(δ
m˜ + h) − β1β2δm˜. The condition pi1(δm˜ + h) > pi1(δm˜) can
then be written as
(
β1 + β2(δ
m˜ + h)− β1β2δm˜
) − (β1 + β2δm˜ − β1β2δm˜+1) > 0. Suitably
rearranging the terms, this can be reduced to h > β1δ
m˜(1 − δ). We are now looking for
some h such that 1− (1+β2)δm˜ ≥ h > β1δm˜(1−δ). Such h exists if and only if δm˜ < 12−δβ1 .
If δm˜ ≥ 1
2−β1δ , then a commitment of δ
m˜ is indeed optimal, as claimed in the lemma.
Step 5. Now turn to the case where δm˜ < 1
2−β1δ . In this case, we have shown in Step
4 that there does exist h > 0 such that δm˜ + h + β2δ
m˜ ≤ 1 and pi1(δm˜ + h) > pi1(δm˜).
Thus, δm˜ is not optimal, and so it follows from the conclusion of Step 3 above that the
optimal c1 belongs to the open interval (δ
m˜, δm˜−1). Since this interval is open, the optimal
commitment level cannot satisfy c1 = δ
m for any m ∈ N0. But then, by the argument
in Step 1, the optimal commitment level must satisfy c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) = 1. Since τ(c1) = m˜
for any c1 ∈ (δm˜, δm˜−1), we can conclude that the optimal commitment level is equal to
1− β2δm˜, as claimed in the lemma.
Step 6. We have shown that in UCE, player 1 commits to ψ1, as defined in the state-
ment of the lemma. Corollary 4.3 implies immediate and efficient agreement. Moreover,
the payoff to player 1 is pi1(ψ1), as desired.

We will now elaborate on the most important implications of the above result and its
proof, and derive a number of corollaries.
To begin with, knowing the payoff function pi1(.) and the UCE commitment level ψ1,
we can explicitly state the UCE payoff for player 1, which we denote by ϕ1.
Corollary 4.5 Player 1’s UCE payoff ϕ1 is given by
ϕ1 =
β1 + β2δm˜ − β1β2δm˜+1 if δm˜ ≥ 12−δβ11− β2δm˜ otherwise
Given that the recognition probabilities of both players and the discount factor all lie
strictly between zero and one, we can see from the above expression for ϕ1 that β1 < ϕ1 < 1.
While player 1 strictly benefits from his commitment power, he never obtains the entire
pie. This is intuitively clear since with the commitment device at hand here, player 2 can
always choose to hold out until τ(c1), in which case some strictly positive surplus will be
left over.
Corollary 4.6 For any configuration of the recognition probabilities and the discount fac-
tor, player 1’s UCE payoff strictly exceeds β1, but falls short of the entire pie.
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Another implication of the above proof is that ψ1 >
1
2
. To see this, suppose by way of
contradiction that ψ1 ≤ 12 . Since 12 + β2δτ(
1
2
) < 1, the arguments in Steps 1 and 3 of the
proof above imply that ψ1 = δ
m˜. But by definition of ψ1, we have that ψ1 = δ
m˜ only if
δm˜ ≥ 1
2−δβ1 . It follows that
1
2
≥ 1
2−δβ1 , a contradiction to the assumption that δ and β1 are
strictly positive.
Corollary 4.7 The optimal commitment level ψ1 is strictly greater than one half, irre-
spective of the choices of δ and β. Moreover, since in UCE agreement is reached with the
commitment effective, the UCE payoff of player 1 is greater than one half.
Theorem 4.4 also implies that in equilibrium, player 1’s commitment is chosen high
enough so that disagreement in round t = 0 would lead to delay until the expiry of the
commitment. To see this, notice that from the definition of m˜, we have δm˜ > δ
1−β2δ . Since
c1 ≥ δm˜ by the proof of the above theorem, it holds that c1 + β2δc1 > δ. Given that
δc1 ≤ δτ(c1), the corollary follows.
Corollary 4.8 In UCE, the sum of players’ aspirations exceeds δt at any time t =
1, . . . , τ(ψ). Thus, a1(ψ1) = 0.
Player 1 makes a commitment which is low enough to deter player 2 from holding out
until time τ(c1). But the previous corollary means that, loosely speaking, the optimal
commitment is not “much” lower then a commitment which would lead to delay. More
precisely, delay would result from any commitment c1 such that c1 > ϕ1. To see this,
notice that by Theorems 4.4 and 3.8 the maximum payoff for player 1 in an SPBE with
immediate agreement of a game G(c1) is equal to ϕ1. This payoff is attained when c1 = ψ1.
Now consider a game G(c1) for some c1 > ϕ1. Suppose that agreement is reached at t = 0
in this game. Since the commitment c1 is effective at time t = 0, the payoff to player 1
must be at least c1. But since c1 > ϕ1, we have a contradiction.
Corollary 4.9 If c1 > ϕ1, then no SPBE of the game G(c1) involves agreement at time
t = 0.
We have pointed out that in UCE an agreement is reached while player 1’s commitment
is effective, therefore we have that ϕ1 ≥ ψ1. In the case where c1 = δm˜, there is some
“friction” between the commitment and the resulting payoff, which arises from the fact
that δτ(c1) changes in a “stepwise” fashion with c1. However, in the limit as δ → 1, these
steps become ever smaller and the said friction vanishes as c1 − δτ(c1) → 0. It is not
surprising, then, that ψ1 and ϕ1 do converge to the same limit. More formally, the UCE
commitment level ψ1 has been defined as equal to either δ
m˜ or 1−β2δm˜. But both of these
terms are arbitrarily close to 1
1+β2
when δ is sufficiently close to one. Similarly, the term
β1 + β2δ
m˜ − β1β2δm˜−1 used in the expression for ϕ1 also converges to that same limit.
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Theorem 4.10 In the limit as δ → 1, the UCE division of the surplus converges to (ϕ¯1, 1−
ϕ¯1) = (
1
1+β2
, β2
1+β2
).
The intuition behind the limit result is as follows. If δ is close enough to one, the surplus
which remains at the moment of truth is nearly equal to the commitment. Thus, player
2 can obtain β2 times the committed amount by delaying agreement until the moment of
truth. Anticipating this, player 1 chooses the commitment just low enough to make player
2 willing to enter into an agreement immediately. Hence, the surplus is divided in the
proportion 1 : β2.
Let us suppose that β2 is very high. Given that the distribution of proposal power
is very favorable to player 2, can player 1 compensate for his weakness if he is given the
possibility to commit? Theorem 4.10 implies that if δ and β2 are both close to one, player
1 can obtain about one half of the pie. Hence, if δ is large, the power of one player to
commit is just sufficient to compensate for the fact that proposal power is concentrated
with the other player. If δ is small, however, the ability to commit is much more powerful
than that. In fact, for δ close to zero, the player who is able to commit can obtain close to
the entire pie even if his proposal power is arbitrarily small. We illustrate these findings
with the following numerical example.
Example 4.11 Let β2 = 0.9. Suppose first that the discount factor is very small, say,
δ = 0.1. In that case, we have that m˜ = 1. The term 1
2−β1δ evaluates to
1
1.99
≈ 0.5. Since
this is greater than δm˜ = 0.1, the optimal commitment level is given by ψ1 = 1 − β2δm˜ =
1− 0.1× 0.9 = 0.91. Also, ϕ1 = 0.91.
Now suppose instead that δ = 0.9; then m˜ = 6. The term 1
2−β1δ evaluates to
1
1.91
≈ 0.52.
Since this is smaller than δm˜ = 0.96 ≈ 0.53, the optimal commitment level is given by
ψ1 = δ
m˜ ≈ 0.53. Consequently,
ϕ1 ≈ 0.1 + 0.9× 0.96 − 0.1× 0.9× 0.97
≈ 0.1 + 0.9× 0.53− 0.09× 0.47
≈ 0.1 + 0.477− 0.0423
≈ 0.5347
This example provides a numerical illustration of the effects of large vs. small discount
factors when the proposal power is prejudiced in the advantage of one player.
We see that for small δ, the implications of our notion of commitment are close to
those which one would expect of an irrevocable and everlasting commitment. For large δ,
however, the type of commitment which we propose leads to different results. This pattern
will be observed more often in the sequel of the paper, when we deal with games in which
both players have access to the commitment device.
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5 Bargaining with two committed players
In this section, we will consider a bargaining (sub–)game G(c1, c2). In this game, the two
players bargain according to the protocol specified earlier for the game G(c1). That is, in
each round a proposer is determined by the probability distribution β. However, in the
game G(c1, c2), both players k = 1, 2 are committed and thus have the following utility
functions.
uk(xk, ck, t) =
xk − λ < 0 if xk < ck ≤ δtxk otherwise
To prepare the analysis, a number of concepts introduced for the game G(c1) need
to be extended formally to the game G(c1, c2). To begin with, we denote by G(c1, c2, t) a
subgame of the game G(c1, c2) which starts with the move of nature at time t. An SPBE in
such a subgame is an SPE which satisfies the two conditions set forth in Definition 3.1. We
say that the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, c2, t) are essentially unique if all SPBE of all subgames
of the type G(c1, c2, t) lead to the same payoffs. We denote these payoffs by v
t
1(c1, c2) and
vt2(c1, c2), where we will sometimes omit the arguments (c1, c2) if no confusion arises. The
definition of aspiration is extended to the new setting as follows.
Definition 5.1 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, c2, t + 1) are
essentially unique, and the corresponding payoff pair is (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, player k’s aspi-
ration at time t under the commitments (c1, c2) is
αtk(c1, c2) = min{xk ∈ [0, 1]|uk(xk, ck, t) ≥ vt+1k )}
This definition implies that
αtk(c1, c2) =
vt+1k (c1, c2) if t ≥ τ(ck)max{ck, vt+1k (c1, c2)} otherwise (4)
for both players k = 1, 2.
The above definition and the next two lemmas provide a backward-induction algorithm
to find the SPBE payoffs in the game G(c1, c2). Intuitively, Lemma 5.2 shows how to reason
backwards from one round to the previous round, while Lemma 5.3 shows how to initialize
the backward induction at the time when both commitments are void.
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Lemma 5.2 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, c2, t+ 1) are essen-
tially unique and equal to (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, the SPBE payoffs of G(c1, c2, t) are essentially
unique as well and given by
vtk(c1, c2) =
αtk(c1, c2) + βk (δt − αtk(c1, c2)− αtl(c1, c2)) if αtk(c1, c2) + αtl(c1, c2) ≤ δtvt+1k otherwise (5)
for any player k = 1, 2 and l 6= k.
This result follows from the proof of Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 5.3 Let t¯ = max{τ(c1), τ(c2)}. In any subgame G(c1, c2, t¯), player k’s (k = i, j)
expected SPBE payoff is equal to βkδ
t¯.
This statement corresponds to Lemma 3.3, and ensures the essential uniqueness of
SPBE of G(c1, c2, t¯). In previous sections, the only player who could commit was referred
to as player 1. This labeling has been arbitrary. Thus, we can define ψk as the optimal
level of commitment which player k = 1, 2 chooses in the game in which he is the only
player who can commit. In a similar way, let pik(ck) be the SPBE payoff in the bargaining
subgame G(ck), and define ϕk = pik(ψk). For the rest of the current section, we will use i
to denote the player with the highest commitment level. That is, we assume without loss
of generality that ci ≥ cj. Let us first consider a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)). That is, we are
interested in a subgame which starts at the time when the higher of the two commitments
has become void. In such a subgame, only player j remains committed. Therefore, it seems
intuitive that such a subgame is equivalent to a bargaining subgame with one committed
player, as we have analyzed in Section 3. This idea is stated more formally in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.4 In any subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)), the SPBE payoffs are equal to
δτ(ci) pij
(
cj δ
−τ(ci)).
Proof: Consider the backward-induction algorithm described by Equations (4)-(5) at
any round t ≥ τ(ci). At such a round t, the Equations (4)-(5) reduce to
αti = v
t+1
i
αtj =
vt+1j if t ≥ τ(cj)max{cj, vt+1j } otherwise
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vtk =
αtk + βk(δt − αti − αtj) if αti + αtj ≤ δtvt+1k otherwise, k = i, j
These equations correspond to Equations (1)-(3) which describe the backward-induction
algorithm in the game with one committed player. We can view each step of this al-
gorithm as a function f(vt+1, cj, δ
t) which determines vt. One can easily verify from
Equations (1)-(3) that this function is linearly homogenous of degree one, that is, we
have f(κvt+1, κcj, κδ
t) = κf(vt+1, cj, δ
t) for any κ > 0. Moreover, we use the fact that
τ(cjδ
t) = τ(cj) + t for t ∈ N0. One implication of this fact is that the backward induction
from τ(cj) to τ(ci) takes as many iterative steps as the backward induction from τ(c˜j) to
round zero, where c˜j = cjδ
−τ(ci). Since in Section 3, the size of the initial surplus was
normalized to one without loss of generality, the claim follows. 
The backward-induction algorithm described by Equations (4)-(5) finds the essentially
unique SPBE payoffs in any bargaining (sub-)game G(ci, cj). We will write these payoffs
to players i and j, respectively, as ωi(ci, cj) and ωj(ci, cj).
Lemma 5.4 has two important implications, which we state in the following two corol-
laries. In Theorem 4.4 we have found the optimal payoff for the only committed player.
Since a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)) is indeed a game with one committed player, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.5 In a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)), player j’s SPBE payoff is at most ϕjδ
τ(ci).
Given any commitment level ci chosen by player i, player j may adopt a strategy which
involves making the commitment ψjδ
τ(ci) and not entering into any agreement before time
τ(ci).
Corollary 5.6 It holds that ωj(ci, ψjδ
τ(cj)) ≥ ϕjδτ(ci).
Intuitively, given any commitment level ci of player i, player j has the option to hold
out until time τ(ci) and then play a subgame in which he is the only committed player.
In such a subgame, the analysis of Section 3 is applicable, and player j’s commitment and
proposal power combined will allow him to capture a share of ϕj of the remaining surplus.
However, this surplus has shrunk by a factor δτ(ci) in the meantime. There is a trade-off
between the advantageous position of the only committed player and the cost of delay
incurred to acquire this position.
We will now provide some illustration of the backward induction procedure in the game
at hand, in which the notion of ci and cj being close to each other plays a crucial role. Let
us suppose that cj is sufficiently small so that cj + βiδ
τ(cj) ≤ 1. Then, we can define
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aj(cj) = max{z ∈ N0|δz ≥ cj + βiδτ(cj)}
Definition 5.7 We say that the commitments ci and cj are close to each other if aj(cj) <
τ(ci).
Lemma 5.8 Suppose cj + βiδ
τ(cj) ≤ 1. Then, ci and cj are close to each other if cj >
ϕjδ
τ(ci).
This statement follows from Corollary 4.9.
Let us suppose first that the commitments are not close to each other. We can then
illustrate the situation with the following time-lines. Lemma 5.3 gives the payoffs in a
subgame starting in round τ(cj), allowing us to initialize the backward induction specified
in Equations (4)-(5). Applying these equations iteratively, we find the following. Before
round τ(cj), the aspirations are βiδ
τ(ci) and cj. Thus, no agreement is possible between
rounds aj(cj) and τ(cj), as indicated by the dotted line segment. But an agreement can be
reached between time τ(ci) and time aj(cj). But going backwards from τ(ci) to τ(ci)− 1,
player i’s aspiration jumps to ci while player j’s aspiration is equal to δ
τ(ci)pij(cjδ
−τ(ci)) as
by Lemma 5.4. If ci+ δ
τ(ci)pij(cjδ
−τ(ci)) > 1, then no agreement can be reached before time
τ(ci), as indicated on the first time-line below.
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` b b`` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` b -t = 0 τ(ci) aj(cj) τ(cj)
If, to the contrary, it holds that ci + δ
τ(ci)pij(cjδ
−τ(ci)) ≤ 1, then we find
b(ci, cj) := max{z ∈ N0|δz ≥ ci + δτ(ci)pij(cjδ−τ(ci))}
as the latest round in which agreement can be reached before τ(ci) – a situation depicted
in the next time-line.
` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` -b b b bt = 0 b(ci, cj) τ(ci) aj(cj) τ(cj)
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Now consider the case where ci and cj are close to each other. In this case, it is not
possible to reach agreement at round aj(cj) since player i’s aspiration has jumped up to ci
already before the backward induction procedure reached round aj(cj). Hence agreement
is impossible between time τ(ci + cj) − 1 (the latest point in time when the surplus is at
least ci + cj) and time τ(cj), as shown in the following time-line. Of course, if ci + cj > 1
and ci and cj are close to each other, no agreement can be reached at all until round τ(cj).
-` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `b b b bt = 0 τ(ci + cj)− 1 aj(cj) τ(ci) τ(cj)
To end the section, we provide two auxiliary results which we will use in the sequel of
the paper. The first statement below says that in SPBE, the lower of the two commitments
is effective at the time of the agreement unless the sum of commitments exceeds one.
Lemma 5.9 If ci + cj ≤ 1, then ωj(ci, cj) ≥ cj.
Proof: Suppose not. Then, there is (ci, cj) such that ci + cj ≤ 1 and ωj(ci, cj) < cj.
By definition of ωj(.), this function gives the payoff arising from some SPBE of the game
G(ci, cj). But in an SPBE, player j does not agree to less than cj before time τ(cj). Hence,
an SPBE of G(ci, cj) must involve delay until at least round τ(cj). By Lemma 5.2, we
have αti + α
t
j > δ
t for all t = 0, 1, . . . , τ(cj) − 1. Notice that the assumption ci ≥ cj and
the supposition ci + cj ≤ 1 imply that cj ≤ 12 . But since δτ(cj) < cj and βi < 1, this in
turn implies cj + βiδ
τ(cj) ≤ 1. Thus, aj(cj) is well-defined and agreement can be reached
in that round unless ci and cj are close to each other. Indeed, suppose now that ci and cj
are close to each other. But then the aspirations in round τ(ci + cj) − 1 are equal to the
commitments ci and cj. Since ci + cj ≤ 1, we have that τ(ci + cj) ≥ 1 and thus agreement
can be reached at some round t ∈ N0, the desired contradiction. 
In particular, if the commitments are close to each other and sum up to exactly one,
then we have α0i + α
0
j = 1: The aspirations at t = 0 are equal to the commitments and
sum up to the total surplus. By the conditions set forth in the definition of an SPBE,
agreement must be reached on the division of the surplus according to the commitments.
Corollary 5.10 If ci+cj = 1 and ci and cj are close to each other, then the SPBE payoffs
are equal to ci and cj.
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6 Optimal commitment for two players
In this section, we turn to the equilibrium analysis of games where both players can commit
before bargaining starts. We will consider one game in which the players make their
commitments sequentially, and one in which the commitments are chosen simultaneously.
Recall that the SPBE payoffs in a bargaining subgame with a given pair of commitments
(c1, c2) are given by ω1(c1, c2) and ω2(c1, c2). Hence, we are effectively considering a game
in which each player’s action is to choose a commitment from the interval [0, 1] and the
payoff functions are given by ω1(c1, c2) and ω2(c1, c2).
In this section, we abandon the notational convention that ci ≥ cj. After giving a
formal definition of a (unique) best-response, we will state a number of auxiliary lemmas,
which will be needed to prove the main results of this section.
Definition 6.1 We say that the commitment c¯j is a best-response to the commitment c¯i
of player i 6= j if it holds that ωj(c¯i, c¯j) ≥ ωj(c¯i, cj) for all cj ∈ [0, 1]. If the inequality holds
strictly for all cj ∈ [0, 1], then we say that c¯j is the unique best-response to c¯i.
The next lemma claims that there is some intermediate range of commitments for player
i so that player j’s best-response is to commit to the exact complement.
Lemma 6.2 Suppose that ci ≤ 1− ϕjδτ(ci) and ci ≥ ϕiδτ(1−ci). Then, it is a best-response
for player j to choose the commitment level cj = 1− ci. The best-response is unique if the
inequalities hold strictly.
Proof: Indeed, suppose that ci ≤ 1 − ϕjδτ(ci) and ci ≥ ϕiδτ(1−ci). By Lemma 5.8, ci
and 1 − ci are close to each other, so that ωi(ci, 1 − ci) = ci and ωj(ci, 1 − ci) = 1 − ci.
We want to show that no choice of commitment cj gives player j a strictly higher payoff
than 1− ci. If player j chooses some cj such that the SPBE of G(ci, cj) involves agreement
before τ(ci), the payoff to player j is bounded above by 1 − ci. But if j chooses cj such
that delay occurs until round τ(ci), then by Corollary 5.5, his payoff is bounded above by
ϕjδ
τ(ci) ≤ 1− ci, as desired. 
In the next lemma, we consider the case where a player has chosen a commitment which
is too high to fall into the range of commitments to which Lemma 6.2 applies. In that
case, we show that it is optimal for the other player to hold out and delay agreement until
this high commitment has expired.
Lemma 6.3 Suppose that ci > 1−ϕjδτ(ci). Then, the unique best-response for player j is
to choose the commitment level cj = ψjδ
τ(ci).
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Proof: Suppose indeed that 1− ci < ϕjδτ(ci). Suppose first that player j chooses some
cj such that in the essentially unique SPBE of G(ci, cj), agreement is reached before τ(ci).
Since the commitment ci is effective at the time of this agreement, the payoff to player j
in this SPBE is at most 1 − ci. But by Corollary 5.6, he can obtain ϕjδτ(ci) > 1 − ci by
committing to ψjδ
τ(ci). Thus, a commitment level cj can only be a best-response for player
j if in an SPBE of G(ci, cj), no agreement is made before round τ(ci). But from Theorem
4.4 and Lemma 5.4, it follows that ψjδ
τ(ci) is uniquely optimal among all commitments cj
which do lead to a delay until round τ(ci) in an SPBE of G(ci, cj). 
Lemma 6.4 below says the following. If player i makes a “high” commitment in the
sense of Lemma 6.3 above, and if player j responds optimally to this by delaying agreement,
then a unilateral deviation to a commitment of zero would be profitable for player i.
Lemma 6.4 If ci is such that 1− ci < ϕjδτ(ci), then ωi(ci, ψjδτ(ci)) < ωi(0, ψjδτ(ci)).
Proof: Suppose that the pair of commitments (ci, cj) is such that cj = ψjδ
τ(ci) and
1− ci < ϕjδτ(ci). In the SPBE of a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)), the payoffs to players i and j,
respectively, will be (1 − ϕj)δτ(ci) and ϕjδτ(ci). But since 1 < ci + ϕjδτ(ci), no agreement
can be reached in an SPBE at any t < τ(ci). Thus, these payoffs are also the payoffs in the
SPBE of the entire bargaining game G(ci, cj). It holds that cj = ψjδ
τ(ci) ≤ ψjδ < ψj. The
first inequality follows because ci > 0 and thus τ(ci) ≥ 1. (Suppose to the contrary that
ci = 0. Then, the supposition that 1−ci < ϕjδτ(ci) reduces to 1 < ϕj, a contradiction.) The
second inequality follows because δ < 1. Now suppose player i deviates to the commitment
cˆi = 0, while player j remains at his commitment level cj < ψj. The induced bargaining
game G(0, cj) is equivalent to the game with one committed player, as analyzed in Section
3. Since cj ≤ ψjδ < ψj, Theorem 3.8 implies that an efficient agreement is reached
immediately in SPBE of G(0, cj). But, by Corollary 5.6, it holds that the payoff to player
j in that agreement is at most ϕj. Thus, the payoff to player i is at least 1 − ϕj. But
1 − ϕj > (1 − ϕj)δτ(ci), so the deviation from ci to cˆi is profitable for player i, as desired.

For player i = 1, 2, we now define a particular commitment level ηi as follows.
ηi = max{ci|ci + ϕjδτ(ci) ≤ 1}
Loosely speaking, ηi is the maximal commitment level which is not “high” in the sense of
Lemma 6.3 above. It is important to realize that ηi ≥ 12 . In order to see this, suppose to
the contrary that ηi <
1
2
. Then, it follows that 1
2
+ ϕjδ
τ( 1
2
) > 1. But ϕj < 1 and δ
τ( 1
2
) < 1
2
,
a contradiction.
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Remark 6.5 The fact that ηi ≥ 12 implies that ϕiδτ(1−ηi) < 12 ≤ ηi. Thus, the commitments
(ηi, 1− ηi) are close to each other.
The next lemma is the last auxiliary which we need to prove the main results of the
section. The lemma says that if player i commits to less than ηi, then player j can always
obtain a greater payoff than 1− ηi by choosing an appropriate commitment.
Lemma 6.6 Suppose that ci < ηi. Then, there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small so that
ωj(ci, 1− ηi + ε) > 1− ηi.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there is a pair of commitments (c¯i, c¯j) such that
c¯i < ηi and c¯j = 1 − ηi + ε, but ωj(c¯i, c¯j) ≤ 1 − ηi < c¯j. We will derive a contradiction
for sufficiently small ε > 0. Before time τ(c¯j), player j does not agree to less than c¯j in
SPBE. Thus, in any SPBE of G(c¯i, c¯j), there must be delay until at least time τ(c¯j). Let
us consider first the case where c¯i > c¯j. In SPBE, the smaller of two commitments expires
only if c¯i+ c¯j > 1 (see Lemma 5.9). This inequality is equivalent to c¯i+1−ηi+ε > 1. Since
ηi > c¯i, we obtain the desired contradiction for sufficiently small ε > 0. Now consider the
case where c¯j ≥ c¯i. Since there is delay until round τ(c¯j), and since δτ(cj) < c¯j, the payoff
to player i in a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(cj)) is strictly smaller than c¯j = 1− ηi + ε. In terms of
the aspirations at time t¯ = τ(cj)− 1, we have αt¯i < c¯j = 1− ηi + ε and αt¯j = c¯j = 1− ηi + ε.
Summing up the aspirations yields αt¯i+α
t¯
i < 2c¯j = 2(1−ηi+ε). Using the fact that ηi ≥ 12 ,
we find αt¯i + α
t¯
i < 1 + 2ε. But if ε > 0 is sufficiently small, then α
t¯
i + α
t¯
i ≤ 1, in which case
agreement is reached in SPBE in round t¯. Since t¯ < τ(c¯j), we have obtained the desired
contradiction. 
We will now turn to the proof of the main results, for which the previous lemmas will be
crucial. We begin with the case in which players choose their commitments sequentially.
More formally, by the sequential commitment game, we mean the game in which first
player 1 chooses a commitment level c1 ∈ [0, 1], then player 2 chooses a commitment
level c2 ∈ [0, 1], and then the bargaining game G(c1, c2) is played. Let (s¯1, s¯2) be a strategy
profile in the sequential commitment game, and suppose that under this strategy profile, the
players choose commitments (c¯1, c¯2). The profile s¯ is a sequential commitment equilibrium
(SQCE) if it satisfies the following conditions.
1. The restriction of s¯ to the bargaining subgame G(c¯1, c¯2) is an SPBE in that bargaining
game.
2. It holds that ω2(c¯1, c¯2) ≥ ω2(c¯1, c2) for all c2 ∈ [0, 1].
3. There is no (c˜1, c˜2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] such that ω2(c˜1, c˜2) ≥ ω2(c˜1, c2) for all c2 ∈ [0, 1],
and ω1(c˜1, c˜2) > ω1(c¯1, c¯2).
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The second condition above means that player 2 responds optimally to player 1’s com-
mitment choice in any SQCE. The third condition means that player 1 chooses his com-
mitment optimally, anticipating the response of player 2. The next theorem claims that
there is a unique SQCE division of the surplus, which is immediately agreed upon.
Theorem 6.7 In any SQCE of the sequential commitment game, an immediate and effi-
cient agreement is reached on the division (η1, 1− η1).
Proof: Suppose first that in some SQCE player 1 chooses c1 > η1. By Lemma 6.3,
player 2 will choose c2 = ψ2δ
τ(c1) in response. The resulting payoffs for player 1 will be
(1−ϕ2)δτ(c1). But if player 1 had chosen a commitment of zero, then player 2’s best-response
would have been to choose ψ2, which would give player 1 the payoff of 1−ϕ2 > (1−ϕ2)δτ(c1).
Hence, we have shown that in SQCE, player 1 chooses c1 such that c1 ≤ η1.
Suppose that player 1 chooses c1 < η1. By Lemma 6.6, player 1’s payoff is then strictly
less than η1. However, he can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to η1. More precisely, if
player 1 chooses c1 = η1 − ε for some sufficiently small ε > 0, then by Lemma 6.2, player
2 will choose c2 = 1− c1 in response and thus player 1 can realize a payoff of c1 = η1 − ε.
Thus, a commitment c1 so that c1 < η1 can never be optimal.
We have now shown that c1 = η1 in an SQCE. By Lemma 6.2, committing to 1− η1 is
a best-response for player 2. Since η1 and 1− η1 are close to each other, agreement is then
reached immediately on the division (η1, 1 − η1). Finally, notice that if ϕ2δτ(c1) = 1 − c1
but ψ2 < ϕ2, then the best-response commitment 1− η1 is not unique. It would also be a
best-response for player 2 to choose ψ2δ
τ(c1). However, this would lead to aspirations of c1
and ϕ2δ
τ(c1) = 1− c1 at round t = 0. By the definition of SPBE, agreement would also be
reached immediately on (η1, 1− η1), as desired. 
Intuitively, Theorem 6.7 can be understood as follows. Once player 1 has chosen c1,
player 2 always has the option to delay agreement until time τ(c1) and then obtain the
payoff ϕ2δ
τ(c1). Player 1 chooses his commitment just low enough so that this option
becomes unattractive for player 2. Qualitatively, the result is similar to that in the game
with one committed player. In that game, the player who is not committed can hold
out until the commitment expires. But after the commitment has expired, the bargaining
powers are given by the recognition probabilities β. In the sequential commitment case,
however, once round τ(c1) is reached, player 2’s bargaining power is given by ϕ2 rather than
just by his recognition probability β2. In sum, we obtain a unique equilibrium prediction
for the division of the surplus. The player who commits first has a first-mover advantage,
but this advantage is weaker than the advantage of the committed over the un-committed
player in the game with a single committed player. In the limit as δ → 1, we have that
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ci − δτ(ci) → 0, and thus ηi converges to the limit η¯i = 11+ϕ¯j . But by Theorem 4.10,
ϕ¯j =
1
1+βi
. Consequently, we have the following limit result.
Theorem 6.8 In the limit as δ → 1, the SQCE division of the surplus converges to (η¯1, 1−
η¯1) = (
1+β1
2+β1
, 1
2+β1
).
We will now turn to the version of the model where both players choose their com-
mitments simultaneously before bargaining starts. More formally, by the simultaneous
commitment game, we mean the game in which first players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose
commitment levels c1 ∈ [0, 1] and c2 ∈ [0, 1], and then the bargaining game G(c1, c2) is
played. Let (s¯1, s¯2) be a strategy profile in the simultaneous commitment game, and (c¯1, c¯2)
the commitments chosen under that profile. The profile s¯ is a simultaneous commitment
equilibrium (SMCE) if its restriction to the bargaining subgame G(c¯1, c¯2) is an SPBE, and
if for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, it holds that ωi(c¯i, c¯j) ≥ ωi(ci, c¯j) for all ci ∈ [0, 1]. That is, each
player’s commitment is a best-response to the other player’s commitment. Theorem 6.9
below shows that there is a range of divisions of the surplus which can be supported by
SMCE. The endpoints of this range are given by the divisions which occur in the sequential
commitment equilibrium, when either player acts as the first mover.
Theorem 6.9 A division (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ of the surplus can be supported by an SMCE of
the simultaneous commitment game if and only if x1 + x2 = 1 and xi ≥ 1− ηj for i = 1, 2
and j 6= i.
Proof: If: Consider a pair of commitments (c¯1, c¯2) such that c¯1 + c¯2 = 1 and c¯i ≥ 1−ηj
for both i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. By definition of ηi, it follows that c¯i ≥ ϕiδτ(c¯j) for both i = 1, 2
and j 6= i. By Lemma 6.2, the commitments (c¯1, c¯2) are best-responses to each other.
Since they are also close to each other, Corollary 5.10 implies that payoffs in the SPBE of
G(c¯1, c¯2) will be (c¯1, c¯2).
Only If: We show first that in any SMCE, we have ci ≤ ηi for both i = 1, 2. Suppose
by way of contradiction that there is some SMCE in which the commitments are (c¯1, c¯2)
and c¯i > ηi for some i = 1, 2. Then, by definition of ηi, it holds that c¯i + ϕjδ
τ(c¯i) > 1
and by Lemma 6.3, it must hold that c¯j = ψjδ
τ(c¯i) for j 6= i. But then, by Lemma 6.4,
setting a commitment cˆi = 0 is a profitable deviation for player i, the desired contradiction.
We show next that player i = 1, 2 obtains at least a payoff of 1− ηj in SMCE. Suppose
by way of contradiction that there is some SMCE leading to payoffs (u¯1, u¯2) such that
u¯j < 1 − ηi for some j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Again, let (c¯1, c¯2) be the commitment levels in
the supposed SMCE. Lemma 6.6 then implies that c¯i ≥ ηi. Suppose first that c¯i = ηi.
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Since ηi and 1 − ηi are close to each other, player j could obtain the payoff of 1 − ηi by
committing to it. Thus, we must have that c¯i > ηi. But we have shown before that this is
not consistent with SMCE, a contradiction.
Finally, we have to show that any SMCE is efficient. Suppose by way of contradiction
that there is some SMCE leading to payoffs (u¯1, u¯2) such that u¯i ≥ 1− ηj for both i = 1, 2
and j 6= i but u¯1 + u¯2 < 1. Let (c¯1, c¯2) be the commitments in the supposed SMCE.
Lemma 5.2 implies that if an agreement x is reached in round t, then x1 + x2 = δ
t.
Since u¯1 + u¯2 < 1, the supposed SMCE must involve disagreement at t = 0. Disagreement
continues until time τ(ck), where we assume ck ≥ cl without loss of generality. By Corollary
5.5, we have u¯l ≤ ϕlδτ(ck). But the supposition is that u¯l ≥ 1− ηk. These two inequalities
imply that ηk +ϕlδ
τ(ck) ≥ 1. But by the definition of ηk, we have ηk +ϕlδτ(ηk) ≤ 1. We see
that ck ≥ ηk. But we have already shown that ck ≤ ηk in an SMCE; thus we can conclude
that ck = ηk and, moreover, ck + ϕlδ
τ(ck) = 1. By Lemma 6.2, player l has two potential
best-responses, namely c′l = 1 − ck and c′′l = ψlδτ(ck). In the former case, immediate
agreement is reached since ck = ηk and 1 − ck are close to each other, a contradiction.
Consider the latter case. At round t = 0, player 2’s aspiration will be ϕlδ
τ(ck). But since
ηk + ϕlδ
τ(ηk) ≤ 1 and ck = ηk, the aspirations at time t = 0 sum up to exactly one. But
any SMCE strategy profile induces an SPBE when restricted to the bargaining subgame,
and in an SPBE agreement is reached when the aspirations sum to the available surplus.
Therefore, we find immediate agreement, a contradiction. 
Passing to the limit as δ → 1, we find the following equilibrium range.
Theorem 6.10 If δ is sufficiently close to one, the surplus division (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ can be
supported by an SMCE of the simultaneous commitment game if and only if x1 + x2 = 1
and xi ≥ 13−βi for both i = 1, 2.
One implication of Theorem 6.10 is that the division (β1, β2) need not be supported by
an equilibrium if it is very lopsided towards one player. Put another way, if the distribution
of proposal power is very disadvantageous for one player, then the commitment power can
mitigate this disadvantage, even if both players have access to the commitment device
simultaneously.
With the conventional notion of irrevocable share–commitments, one would expect the
simultaneous commitment case to be a mere coordination problem in which any distribution
can be supported by some equilibrium. In the model at hand, this is still nearly true
if δ is close to zero. However, if δ is close to one, the range of equilibrium divisions
shrinks considerably. More precisely, in the limit as δ → 1, the share of the surplus whose
allocation is left unpredicted by SMCE is at most one fifth. Conversely, for large δ, SMCE
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is sufficiently strong as a solution concept to determine eighty percent of the allocation.
Moreover, we note that each player’s share is bounded below by one third, even with
arbitrarily low recognition probability.
Comparing the results for the sequential and simultaneous commitment games, two
common points emerge.
First, our model yields predictions tantamount to what one would expect with irrevo-
cable, everlasting commitments if δ is close to zero, but produces very different results if
δ is close to one. The intuition is that with a small δ, the option to hold out until the
opponent’s commitment becomes void is very unattractive and hence commitment confers
a lot of power.
Second, for large δ, the ability to make a commitment of the type which we propose
ensures that a player will get at least one third of the surplus, even if his recognition
probability is arbitrarily small. In a sense, the ability to commit is worth one third of the
surplus to each player, while the value of proposal power lies in determining the allocation
of the remaining third.
Since the range of SMCE divisions depends on the recognition probabilities and the
discount factor, we ask whether there is any equilibrium division which is robust to changes
in these parameters. The following theorem claims that the equal split of the surplus is
consistent with SMCE irrespective of the aforementioned parameters. Moreover, the equal
split is the only division with this property.
Theorem 6.11 A surplus division (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ can be supported by an SMCE of the
simultaneous commitment game for all δ and for all β if and only if (x1, x2) = (
1
2
, 1
2
).
Proof: If: Since ηi ≥ 12 for i = 1, 2, we also have 1 − ηi ≤ 12 . The claim follows from
Theorem 6.9.
Only if: Consider a pie division in which player k = 1, 2 obtains a payoff of 1
2
− ε,
where ε > 0. By Theorem 6.10, if δ is sufficiently large, SMCE requires 1
2
− ε ≥ 1
3−βk .
This can be rewritten as βk ≤
1
2
−3ε
1
2
−ε . But we have assumed that ε > 0, thus
1
2
−3ε
1
2
−ε < 1.
Consequently, choosing δ sufficiently large and βk ∈
(
1
2
−3ε
1
2
−ε , 1
)
ensures that the pie division
under consideration is not supported by any SMCE. 
In the simultaneous commitment game, any division (x, 1− x) with 0 < x < 1 can be
supported by SMCE for some choice of β and δ, but Theorem 6.11 shows that the equal
split is unique in being consistent with SMCE for any choice of these parameters. The
equal split emerges as a robust focal point within the range of equilibria.
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7 Conclusion
We have studied the division of a shrinking surplus through a bilateral bargaining procedure
with commitment. We have proposed a new notion of commitment, which has two main
characteristics. Commitment is stated in time value terms, and a commitment expires
when it has been rendered infeasible by the passage of time and the ensuing shrinkage
of the surplus. As a result of this modeling approach, there is a trade-off between the
amount to which one commits and the duration of the commitment. Relatively moderate
commitments stay in effect for longer than extreme commitments.
We have focussed our analysis on three games, namely, a game in which only one player
can commit before bargaining starts, a game in which both players commit sequentially
before bargaining starts, and a game in which the two players commit simultaneously
prior to the bargaining stage. In each of these cases, we have applied slight refinements
of subgame-perfect equilibrium as solution concepts. In an equilibrium, we always find
immediate agreement on a division which corresponds to the commitments. In a sense,
the agreement is already pre-determined in the commitment stage, while the bargaining
stage plays the role of a threat which has a moderating influence on players’ choice of a
commitment.
In the game with one committed player , we have uniquely predicted the division of the
surplus. The committed player obtains strictly between one half and the entire surplus,
and always does strictly better than in a benchmark game without commitment. The
equilibrium division of the surplus depends in a discontinuous and non-monotonic way
on the discount factor. However, when the discount factor is very small, commitment
confers the most bargaining power. Conversely, when the discount factor is very close to
one, the recognition probabilities are relatively important as a source of bargaining power.
More precisely, if the discount factor is close to one and the recognition probability of the
committed player is close to zero, then the surplus is divided nearly equally. In this sense,
proposal power and commitment power are “equally important” in the limit.
In the game where both players commit sequentially, we have also found a unique
prediction for the division of the surplus. There is a first-mover advantage since the first
mover obtains between one half and two thirds of the surplus, depending on the choice of
the recognition probabilities.
In the game with simultaneous commitments, a range of surplus divisions is supported
by equilibria. If the discount factor is sufficiently large, this range shrinks to at most
one fifth of the entire range of feasible divisions. If the commitments were of unlimited
duration, then we would expect the strategic situation to collapse to a pure coordination
problem, where subgame-perfect equilibrium (or a technical refinement thereof) would have
no predictive power with regard to the division. With our notion of commitment, the range
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of equilibrium divisions is significantly smaller when we choose the discount factor large
enough. Moreover, in the model at hand, the equal split emerges as a focal point within the
range of equilibrium divisions. We have established that the equal split is the only division
which is supported by an equilibrium regardless of the values of the discount factor and
the recognition probabilities.
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